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Constitutional Law-The Widening Scope of
State Habeas Corpus Relief
D, an indigent, pleaded guilty to a charge of grand larceny in
the Circuit Court of Logan County. At no time during the
proceeding did he have assistance of counsel, nor did the court in
any manner inform him of his right to counsel. While confined to
the penitentiary, he filed with the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
he was denied assistance of counsel. Held, writ granted. The
right of an accused to assistance of counsel is a fundamental right,
essential to a fair trial. This safeguard, provided by the sixth
amendment to the Constitution, is made obligatory upon the states
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Waiver
of this right must be made intelligently and understandingly. It
cannot be presumed from a failure to request counsel, a record
silent as to a request for counsel, or the entry of a guilty plea.
State ex. rel. May v. Boles, 139 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1964).
Prisoners and prosecutors alike have become vitally concerned with the possibility of a wider latitude of habeas corpus
relief now available in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia. Although this post-conviction remedy is available on both
the state and federal levels, the federal writ has been significantly
wider in scope. The petitioner, under the exhaustion doctrine, must
first seek relief in the state courts. In West Virginia habeas corpus
traditionally has been the proper remedy when the judgment of the
convicting court is void, as when the court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person. Habeas corpus relief
in the federal courts, on the other hand, has been extended to cover
cases in which, though the court had jurisdiction, the conviction
occurred in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused.
In 1950, the West Virginia court held that a proceeding may be
reversed for either irregularityor illegality, but that only the latter
defect gave authority to discharge on habeas corpus. The court
pointed out that it would be irregular to sentence a person to imprisonment in his absence, where the absence was occasioned by the
order of the court pronouncing the sentence. It would be illegal,
the court stated, to sentence him to imprisonment for a crime
punishable by pecuniary fine only. Dye v. Skeen, 135 W. Va. 90,
62 S.E.2d 681 (1950).
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Because many state courts will grant habeas corpus only for
defects in the original trial and not for claims of unconstitutional
actions, the Supreme Court of the United States, in its review of
state decisions, has had to determine whether the states are obliged
to protect the federal rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. While insisting that there is a constitutional duty on the
states to provide post-conviction remedies for all due process
objections, the Court has refrained from holding that a state court
must entertain such post-conviction claims. Instead, it usually
recommends that petitioners seek relief by way of collateral federal
remedies. Note, 53 COLUm. L. Rlv. 1143 (1953).
In the principal case, however, the West Virginia Court expressly
relied on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in
granting the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus. In so doing, the
court held that its unanimous decision was controlled by the decision
in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In that case the
Supreme Court held that the due process clause requires that
counsel be appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a state
prosecution. The rationale in Gideon-as well as in the West Virginia case-is founded on the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932): "The right to be
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." In deciding Gideon, the
Court expressly overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),
which stood for the somewhat ambiguous rule that the right to
counsel in state courts was not a "fundamental" right unless the
defendant for some reason could not prepare and present his own
defense. It is interesting to note that West Virginia was one of
twenty-two states which filed briefs as Friends of the Court,
urging the overruling of Betts v. Brady, supra, 65 W. VA. L. Rv.
297 (1963).
The instant case, however, does not fall completely within the
ambit of Gideon. Both defendants were indigents, but Gideon asked
the court for counsel and May did not. Further, the West Virginia
Constitution, unlike the Florida Constitution, provides that "In all
such trials [crimes and misdemeanors], the accused... shall have
the assistance of counsel. .. ." W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14. In holding that the right to counsel is absolute, the Court in Gideon does not
say that every criminal conviction is void because the accused has
not been represented by counsel. To the contrary, it has been con-
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sistently held that the right to counsel may be waived. A waiver of
this right in West Virginia, as in federal jurisdictions, has to be
made intelligently and understandingly. Prior to the May case,
however, the general rule was that waiver of this right was
presumed by failure of an accused to request counsel, by his entry
of a guilty plea or by reason of a record silent on the matter of
counsel. Wade v. Skeen, 140 W. Va. 565, 85 S.E.2d 845 (1955);
State v. Briggs, 58 W. Va. 291, 52 S.E. 218 (1905); State v. Kellison,
56 W. Va. 690, 47 S.E. 166 (1904).
The petitioner in the instant case, without the assistance of
counsel, entered a plea of guilty. The court records were silent
on the matter of counsel. Relying on Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506 (1962), the court held that the due process clause will not
permit a presumption of waiver under such circumstances. The
court in the principal case did not mention Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S.
391 (1963), where the Supreme Court decided that federal habeas
corpus relief was not to be denied on grounds that a federal constitutional right had not been demanded and preserved in prior
state proceedings. Under the rule in Fay v. Noia, supra, only a
knowing and intentional waiver in the state court of a federal constitional right would bar raising this right in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding. The Fay case pertained to constitutional rights
generally, Carnley to right to counsel specifically.
Fay was relied on in State ex. rel. Banach v. Boles, 131 S.E.2d
722 (W. Va. 1963), which apparently marked the first time the
West Virginia court awarded habeas corpus relief on the basis
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In this
case, the petitioner had been denied his constitutional right to
a free transcript. Time for appeal had expired but the court,
expressly relying on the Fay case, held that the failure to appeal
did not exhaust state remedies still open to the petitioner at the
time he filed his application for habeas corpus in the federal court.
The principal case establishes that the right to counsel in state
criminal proceedings is a right which will not be presumed to be
waived by a silent record or a guilty plea. What is to be the direct
effect of the May case and its four companion cases in West
Virginia? In a "two or three month" period immediately preceding
the May decision, eighty-eight petitions for habeas corpus relief
based on the rule in the Gideon case were mailed to the West Virginia Supreme Court. Charleston Gazette-Mail, Dec. 20, 1964,
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p. ID, col. 3. Whether the May decision will trigger an even greater
number of petitions remains to be seen. Further, prosecutors
attempting to convict writ holders subjected to retrial will undoubtedly find it difficult to ferret out evidence and witnesses
used perhaps scores of years ago to obtain the prior conviction.
The current practice appears to rely heavily on affadavits obtained
from persons involved in the prior proceedings in cases where the
record is silent as to the matter of counsel.
The problems raised in West Virginia by the direct effect of May
and related cases are only overshadowed in import by the possible
indirect effect of these landmark decisions. Are the May and
Banach cases opening wedges which will broaden the relief available under state habeas corpus to situations other than denial of
counsel and the right to a free transcript? Ultimately the question
becomes whether state habeas corpus should be expanded to permit
any issue which could be raised in federal habeas corpus proceedings. And, as a corollary, should it cover denial of state constitutional rights which extend beyond or are not covered by federal
constitutional rights?
The Supreme Court of the United States held in 1961 that evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure is not admissible
in state courts because of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). However, the
effect of Mapp in West Virginia remains to be determined even
though the state constitution already prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6. The West Virginia
court has held that since this provision is substantially the same as
pertinent provisions of the federal constitution, it should be given
a construction in harmony with construction of the general provisions in the federal constitution. State v. Brunet, 143 W. Va. 755,
105 S.E.2d 140 (1958). Moreover, the Supreme Court of the
United States has ruled that the states are bound by the federal
doctrine of "reasonableness" in regard to searches and seizures.
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Thus, if the standard of
reasonableness in West Virginia fails to meet the federal standard,
this gap conceivably could be a constitutional ground for habeas
corpus relief. One commentator notes, however, that the Gideon
decision creates a greater susceptibility to post-conviction collateral
attack than the Mapp decision because in right-to-counsel cases
waiver of the right will not be presumed by a silent record; while
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in cases involving the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence,
some indication of an unreasonable search and seizure must be
present in the record. Note, 18 Sw. L. J. 284, 290 (1964).
Although state habeas corpus may someday be applied on the
basis of the exclusionary rule as set out in Mapp, perhaps a more
likely avenue of approach for prisoners seeking state habeas corpus
relief lies in the federal constitutional requirements regarding
confessions. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), the Supreme
Court held that state hearings on the voluntariness of a confession
may be conducted by the trial judge, another judge, or an independently convened jury, but not by the trial jury. The Court
stated that permitting a jury to determine both voluntariness and
guilt is unfair and unreliable, thus depriving the accused of his
rights without due process of law.
The practice in West Virginia, when an objection to a confession
is interposed, is to hold a preliminary hearing out of the presence
of the jury at which the trial judge fully determines the coercion
issue. This procedure was attacked by the United States Supreme
Court in Boles v. Stevenson, 85 Sup. Ct. 174 (1964). The Court
held that such procedure was a denial of due process in that it was
not fully adequate to insure a reliable determination of the voluntariness of the confession, since the record failed to show if the
trial judge decided whether the confession was involuntary, or, if
voluntary, what standards he used. The prisoner was to be afforded
either a hearing on the voluntariness or a new trial; in the event of
neither, he should be released. Whether the May rule will be
extended to cover these federal constitutional safeguards in a state
habeas corpus proceeding remains to be seen, even though they
stem from the familiar due process clause.
The voluntariness standard now appears to be so sensitive that
police refusal of any reasonable request constitutes coercion. In
Escobedo v. Illinois, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964), the defendant, during
a police investigation before he was formally indicted, was denied
a request to consult with his attorney. Mr. Justice Goldberg, expressing the view of five members of the Court, stated that the
investigation had focused on the accused as a suspect and had lost
the quality of a general investigation. Hence, the refusal to honor
the accused's request constituted a denial of his right to the
assistance of counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
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Mr. Justice Stewart dissented on the grounds that the right to
assistance of counsel should not attach until the formal institution
of proceedings by indictment, information or arraignment. He
reasoned that the majority's holding could have an unfortunate
impact on the fair administration of criminal justice. It may be
argued that if the requirement to provide counsel is extended to
the moment of detention, extra-judicial confessions might categorically be held inadmissible. Note, 63 Miclr. L. RBv. 381 (1964).
The West Virginia court has awarded habeas corpus relief on
the basis of two federal constitutional grounds-the right to counsel
and the right to a free transcript. This provided a significant
broadening of the rather limited reach of the traditional state habeas
corpus remedy. There appears to be nothing to prevent the court
from awarding state habeas corpus relief on the basis of a violation
of constitutional rights laid out in the Jackson, Stevenson and
Escobedo cases. If May and Banach actually represent a crack
in the door, as they appear to, state habeas corpus relief conceivably
could be opened to all constitutional objections which may now
be advanced in federal courts.
Lester Clay Hess, Jr.

Criminal Law-Confessions Before Arraignment
Petitioner, a state prisoner, sought habeas corpus relief in the
federal court. Petitioner claimed that his state court conviction
violated his constitutional rights because it was based on an
inadmissible confession. The confession was obtained after he had
been arrested without a warrant and questioned about a fire which
had resulted in a death. No formal charges were lodged against
petitioner until after the confession had been signed. The writ of
habeas corpus was denied and petitioner appealed. Held, affirmed.
The use of a confession freely given does not deny due process,
even though the confession was obtained during a period of unlawful detention. The test is whether the confession was voluntary
or coerced. Allen v. Bannan, 332 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1964).
State concern with admissibility of evidence obtained between
arrest and arraignment has become more intense since the establishment of the McNabb-Mallory rule in the federal courts. This
rule excludes from federal prosecutions all incriminating statements
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